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Abstract—The energy transition that began in Germany 
in 2000 is widely accepted by the population. Opinion 
research institutes report that more than 90 per cent agree 
with the policy adopted. Nevertheless, in the public debate 
in recent years increasingly critical opinions were voiced. In 
particular, the increased costs of the energy transition are 
discussed, which are to be borne by the population and the 
economy.
Despite increased burdens in all areas of the energy 
transition, the criticism is mostly due to the increased 
burden on electricity customers through the increased use 
of renewable energy. One reason for this is the increase in 
the Renewable Energy Act (EEG / Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz) surcharge, which finances the expansion of 
renewable energies and which ultimately has to be borne 
by the customers of the energy supply companies. This 
surcharge increased by 74 per cent in the years 2012 to 2014 
alone. One of the main reasons for this was the excessive 
subsidization of electricity from photovoltaic systems from 
2008 to 2012, which was primarily used by major investors 
and resulted in a massive expansion. Although the share of 
renewable energies in the German electricity mix has thus 
increased, an economic equivalent, such as a sustainable 
increase in jobs or high export figures among the companies 
that produce these plants, was not observed. 
Today, economists ask to what extent this mistake could 
have been avoided and to what extent this has damaged the 
reputation of the energy transition. The economic policy 
debate on this issue is led by various interest groups whose 
opinions are widely divergent. Establishing public consensus 
is difficult, yet essential for a successful continuation of the 
energy transition.
Keywords—sustainable energy, sustainable development, 
solar energy, Germany
I. IntroductIon
The German energy transition beginning in 2000 
remains widely accepted by the population. According 
to public opinion research, more than 90 per cent of 
respondents agree with the adopted policy [1].   
The reasons for the severe acceptance are as follows: 
• It is widely agreed on phasing out nuclear energy;
• The effects of climate change become increasingly 
perceptible;
• Fear of missing the national climate control goals;
• Concerns about declining reserves of conventional 
sources of energy and rising global consumption.
Nevertheless, the public debate in recent years has 
been increasingly critical. Particularly, the rising cost of 
the energy transition, which are paid for by households 
and businesses, have been met with criticism. Despite 
increased investments in branches such as grid expansion 
and energy efficiency in mobility and housing, the 
discussion revolves around the rising cost of electricity 
and the burdens it entails for consumers due to the 
increased use of renewable energies.
An argument repeatedly cited by critics is the 
disproportionate funding of power from solar plants 
between 2008 and 2012. Today, science and politics 
wonder whether this mistake could have been avoided 
and how future damage can be averted from further 
proceedings of the energy transition.
II. FunctIonIng, developments and dIscussIon
After the first participation of the Green Party in the 
German Federal Government in 1998, its goal to introduce 
a law promoting renewable power sources was quick-
ly implemented. The Green Member of the Bundestag 
Hans-Josef Fell and the SPD politician Herman Scheer 
were in charge of the respective piece of legislation.
The Renewable Energy Sources Act (Gesetz für Vor-
rang Erneuerbarer Energien, EEG) [2]    introduced on 1 
April 2000 provided for the following three framework 
conditions for power generation from renewable sources 
of energy:
1) Plant operators are obliged to connect their plant to the 
power grid while network operators must implement 
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the connection immediately [3]. 
 2) Network operators must expand the grid in order to 
reliably transmit the generated power [4].   
3) The plant operators receive specific and technology-
dependent remuneration from the network operator 
rated per kilowatt hour fed into the grid [5].   
 The feed-in tariff is disbursed by the network operator 
for a period of 20 years and financed by the surcharge 
on electricity consumers. The EEG surcharge is equal for 
all customers regardless of the local power supplier and 
its amount is recalculated every year. For this purpose, 
the so-called EEG account is used. It is financed by the 
revenues of the EEG surcharge and used for remuneration 
of renewable power plant operators. For reasons of 
international competitiveness, a hardship provision was 
included for energy-intensive companies exempting them 
from the EEG surcharge.
Initially, this simple and transparent cost allocation 
system was hardly taken seriously by the representatives 
of the conventional energy industry and sometimes even 
ridiculed as an April fool’s joke. However, as it had 
become evident that the EEG provided incentives for 
investments in renewable energies, similar measures have 
been adopted by other countries. 
Eventually it has been agreed that this law was 
a milestone in the sought German energy transition. 
The share of renewable energies in national electricity 
production increased from 6.6% in 2000 to 35.0% in 
2018 [6].  Germany ranks fourth in the world in terms 
of installed capacity of plants generating electricity 
from renewable sources. It also ranks fourth in terms of 
installed photovoltaic capacity [7].  
The increase of the EEG surcharge has been the 
most regarded point in the public debate on the cost of 
electricity generated from renewable energies. As Fig. 1 
shows, the EEG surcharge has risen since its introduction 
in 2000 from 0.19 to 6.41 euro cents per kilowatt hour 
consumed by the end customer in 2019. 
Currently, the EEG surcharge accounts for about 20 
per cent of the electricity price in Germany. Assuming an 
electricity price of 30 euro cent per kWh, a family of four 
with an annual consumption of 3,500 kWh receives an 
electricity bill of 1,050 euros of which about 224 euros 
are allocated to the EEG surcharge.
Fig. 1. EEG surcharge for end consumers [8].
The sharp increase of the EEG surcharge from 2012 
to 2014 of 2.65 euro cents (74 per cent) is attributed to 
the funding of electricity production from photovoltaic 
systems in previous years.
Chronologically, this development can be summarised 
in three steps:
 A. The years 2000 to 2007
Despite high remuneration rates, photovoltaic plants 
did not significantly contribute to the German energy 
production. Solar modules were priced uncompetitively 
high and their technical reliability was insufficient. 
Among investors scepticism about the ability of the then 
state-of-the-art technology to achieve an operating life of 
at least 20 years prevailed.
The first plants to profit from the EEG subsidy, on 
the other hand, were onshore wind energy farms due 
to the advanced level of technology and the attractive 
remuneration rates for investors. Also, building and 
environmental laws caused affordable expenditure and 
the planning procedure was usually quick. 
Fig. 2. Year 2003 in wind energy: Installation and total capacity [9].
With a growth in wind power output from 9.5 billion 
kWh in 2000 to 26.4 billion kWh in 2004 [10], Germany 
achieved the world’s leading position in this power 
generation technology. As shown in Fig. 2, the year 
2003 particularly depicts this advancement—Germany 
superseded countries with considerably higher wind 
potential such as England, Spain and the USA in terms 
of total installed capacity as well as increase in installed 
capacity.
Regarding the high population density of Germany 
and the fact that quality of life in the vicinity of a wind 
power plant leaves much to be desired, the disadvantages 
of this development are swiftly revealed. Eventually, 
the areas designated for the construction of wind plants 
decreased and the negative aspects of this rapid growth 
became visible. Voices calling for slower growth became 
louder and were heard by politicians. The first amendment 
to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in 
2004 contained a significant reduction in remuneration 
rates for wind power plants. The later growth of wind 
power therefore predominately roots in the installation of 
new offshore wind turbines and repowering. 
As the remuneration rates for wind power have had 
been reduced and the search for locations for constructing 
wind farms has had been restricted by building and 
environmental law, many investors in green technologies 
sought alternative investments discovering the potential 
of solar energy, particularly photovoltaic. 
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There were two predominant reasons for this 
development:
Firstly, in the initial amendment of the EEG of 2004, the 
legislator again increased the subsidy rates for electricity 
generation from photovoltaic [11].  This was a necessary 
measure since a reduction in the growth of wind energy 
was expected and needed to be compensated for in order 
in order not to jeopardise the overall objective to expand 
electricity generation from renewable energies. The 
remuneration of electricity generation from photovoltaic 
plants had already been the highest in the EEG of 2000 
and has now reached a level of more than 50 euro cents 
per kWh. The gross electricity price for the end consumer 
at that time amounted to about 18 euro cents per kWh.
Secondly, the technological progress combined 
with increasing competition leading to more economic 
procurement prices of solar modules, improved quality as 
well as a longer operating life.
These aspects have triggered the boom in the German 
solar industry. The number of manufacturers of solar 
modules and also the newly erected photovoltaic systems 
rose rapidly.
As depicted in Fig. 3, the cumulative photovoltaic 
output in Germany grew from 1.11 GWp in 2004 to 4.17 
GWp in 2007, and in 2012 even reached 33.3 GWp.
B. The years 2008 to 2012
Characteristic for these years was further technical 
progress and the increasing competition on the solar 
module market. Module prices declined as performance 
and reliability increased. Lobbying by the solar industry 
prevented effective countermeasures such as a rapid and 
substantial reduction of the remuneration for solar power 
or the introduction of a market-based remuneration linked 
to market energy prices. Thus the aforementioned ample 
growth was possible with new records after each year 
[13].  Balancing the EEG account however could only be 
facilitated by substantially increasing the EEG surcharge 
as Fig. 1 shows. 
Fig. 3. Cumulative installed capacity of photovoltaic plants in Ger-
many [12].
A major argument presented by the lobby was a vast 
job creation which was mainly enabled through   national 
subsidies in economically underdeveloped Lands of the 
Federal Republic such as Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony. 
Unfortunately, this development was not sustainable, 
as the import of solar modules from Asia had already 
increased massively in 2009. The domestic solar industry 
was not competitive with suppliers from the Far East, 
who often received subsidies from their governments. 
The production costs of German companies alone were 
up to 15 percent higher than those of Asian competitors 
[14].  The market share of German manufacturers for 
the domestic market fell to 15 percent. Fig. 4 depicts the 
resulting decrease in the number of employees of the 
German solar industry starting in 2011. 
There were no protective measures such as import 
tariffs for the domestic solar industry during this period. 
The increasingly adverse sentiment in the industry 
combined with rising electricity prices, which to a large 
extent were attributed to the rising EEG surcharge and thus 
directly to the growth of photovoltaic output, significantly 
changed public opinion from 2012 onwards. 
Simply put—photovoltaic served as a scapegoat for 
the increase in the EEG surcharge.
In the first two quarters of 2012 discussions inflamed 
in the media about the sharp increase of the EEG 
surcharge pushing electricity prices and the struggling 
incipient solar industry. Lobby associations representing 
various stakeholders as well as the public demanded swift 
political intervention and—resultant thereof—changes in 
legislation. 
The representatives of the solar industry demanded the 
high remuneration rates to be maintained, further state aid 
to be provided for the domestic solar industry and import 
duties to be imposed on foreign manufacturers. The latter 
were modelled on the US customs regulations, which 
imposed high import duties on Chinese solar modules in 
May 2012 to protect their domestic manufacturers.
The trade and industry associations of the other 
sectors criticised the high energy prices and warned of 
the resulting disadvantages for the German economy in 
international competition. The loss of purchasing power 
of the local population was also often cited as an argument 
here.
The representatives of the left-wing opposition parties 
and the trade unions criticized the electricity prices 
for citizens and businesses and questioned the further 
development of the energy transition with regard to costs 
[15].  For socially weaker sections of the population, 
the additional burden of rising energy costs remains a 
considerable risk of poverty today.
The then federal government, consisting of a coalition 
of the conservative parties of the CDU/CSU and the 
more economically liberal FDP, came under pressure, 
especially in view of the upcoming federal elections in 
2013. The responsible Federal Environment Ministry 
under the then Federal Environment Minister Norbert 
Röttgen announced reforms of the EEG, which however 
were not considered sufficient by the government and 
other stakeholders with the exception of the German 
solar lobby. The remuneration rates were only reduced 
insignificantly and market-oriented remuneration models 
were not mandatory for investors.
Reducing the growth of electricity production from 
photovoltaic systems as well as the EEG surcharge 
could not have been expected and the loss of jobs in 
the German solar industry was already visible. In May 
2012, the minister was dismissed from the government 
cabinet and thus was bearing a vast portion of the political 
responsibility. 
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Fig. 4. Number of employees in the German photovoltaic industry 
from 2010 to 2016 [16].
Eventually, the German government decided to 
amend the EEG in August 2012 with retroactive effect 
to 1 April 2012. It included a retroactive reduction 
of the remuneration, but a mandatory market-based 
remuneration with a higher risk for the investors had not 
yet been implemented. Other countries in the European 
Union faced—albeit not to this extent—similar problems 
with the unbearably rapid growth of electricity production 
from photovoltaic plants, which were usually solved by 
retroactive reductions in subsidies. Economists agreed 
that this was the only way to prevent a further rapid 
increase in energy costs.
C. The years 2013 to 2018
In 2013, the German solar industry was in a rather 
difficult state. Numerous companies filed for bankruptcy, 
the number of employees fell from 133,000 thousand in 
2010 to 60,000 in 2013 as shown in Fig. 3. The European 
Union’s protective tariffs were not introduced until May 
2013. For suppliers from China, a minimum price for 
the solar modules and an annual quota for imports were 
determined. The terms were negotiated cautiously as 
other industries headed by the automotive industry feared 
countermeasures restricting the access of their products 
to the valuable Chinese market. The declining trend in 
employment was not be stopped in the following years 
either. In 2016 there were only 32,000 employees left in the 
solar sector and in 2018 Solarworld AG, the last German 
mass manufacturer of solar modules, disappeared from 
the market. Only manufacturers producing specialised 
products with small quantities are still available today.
In response to rising electricity prices, politicians 
have made numerous attempts not to allow the EEG 
surcharge to further increase. In 2013, the new Federal 
Environment Minister Peter Altmaier presented proposals 
to minimize the further increase of the EEG surcharge 
containing a provision limiting the increase to 2.5 per cent 
annually. However, the possible measures of reducing the 
remuneration combined with a suspension of disbursement 
were not implemented in the current EEG.  
In 2014, the EEG was again amended to include a 
mandatory market-based solution for large solar power 
plants. The last amendment to the EEG in 2017 introduced 
a new regulation, requiring tenders for large solar 
installations. In these cases, the bidder with the lowest 
bid for feed-in remuneration is awarded the contract. This 
amendment to the EEG enables a controlled promotion 
of the individual forms of energy with binding target 
corridors.
These measures stabilised the EEG surcharge at the 
high level and prevented further growth. However, a 
significant reduction is not to be expected in the next few 
years, due to the 20-year funding period of the rigid old 
regulation.
III. summary
In summary, it is to be stated that the history of the 
German law on promoting renewable energies is a 
successful one. The mistakes were not inherent in the 
law, but rather due to adhering to rigid remuneration 
regulations, which were also preferred by investors, for 
too long. The EEG surcharge, which has now increased 
to 6.41 euro cents, is an essential component of the high 
electricity prices in Germany of approx. 30 euro cents. 
This still provokes criticism in politics and business [17]. 
Also the lack of inclusion of the citizens is to be 
considered a problem here. A visible change in the 
landscape—especially in the case of wind energy—in 
conjunction with rising electricity prices has regularly 
caused dissatisfaction among the population. The 
population was and still remains positive about the energy 
transition, but the aspect of rising costs eventually allocated 
as profits to anonymous investors does not contribute to 
the positive image of the EEG. Here the partially already 
existing co-ownership of plats by citizens could soothe 
the waters. 
Also the fast loss of thousands of jobs in the German 
solar industry can be seen as a stumbling block of the 
German energy transition, because especially in the 
economically underdeveloped regions the affected people 
faced difficulties when seeking new employment.
Prospectively, therefore, a swifter monitoring, quick 
political reactions to technical and economic changes and 
lowering the influence from individual lobby associations 
will be crucial.
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